IOSCO: Its Mission and Achievement by Sommer, A.A. Jr.




IOSCO: Its Mission and Achievement
A.A. Jr. Sommer
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
A.A. Jr. Sommer, IOSCO: Its Mission and Achievement, 17 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 15 (1996-1997)
ARTICLES
IOSCO: Its Mission and Achievement*
A. A. Sommer, Jr.**
ORIGINS
The origins of the International Organization of Securities Com-
missions (IOSCO) lie in the Americas. In 1974, nations of the West-
em Hemisphere, largely under the leadership of the United States,
organized the InterAmerican Association of Securities Commissions
to provide a forum for consideration of securities regulation matters
of common interest and to assist capital formation in the Western
Hemisphere. Nine years later the organization transformed itself into
a world-wide organization and was incorporated by an act of the Que-
bec Parliament as a non-profit corporation under Quebec law. A sec-
retariat was established in Montreal, a recognition of the expanded
scope of the organization. IOSCO perceives the transition from a
* This article is published unedited at the author's request and is solely the responsibility of
the author. The Journal added citation to relevant authority, when available, and retains
responsibility for citation form.
** Counsel, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius.
The author wishes to acknowledge the great assistance provided by former Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman David A. Ruder, presently William W. Gurley Memo-
rial Professor of Law at Northwestern University School of Law; Linda C. Quinn, formerly Di-
rector, SEC Division of Corporation Finance, presently partner, Shearman & Sterling, New York
City; and Michael D. Mann, Director, and Paul A. Leder, Deputy Director, SEC Office of Inter-
national Affairs. These persons were, during their time with the SEC, active participants in
IOSCO activities and their insights stemming from that participation have been very helpful in
preparing this article.
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Western hemisphere endeavor to a world-wide one not as the succes-
sion of one organization by another, but rather as a continuum; for
instance, it numbers its annual meetings from the inception of the In-
terAmerican Association; thus the first meeting of IOSCO in 1987 was
called the Twelfth Annual Conference. The 1988 Annual Report was
the first published, hence it is difficult to gain much insight into the
1974-1988 activity of the regulators.'
PURPOSES
The bylaws of the reconstituted IOSCO state the purposes of the
organization and, while the emphases and priorities have changed, the
formal statement of purpose has not. The members committed:
*to cooperate together to ensure a better regulation of the markets,
on domestic as well as on the international level, in order to maintain
just and efficient markets;
*to exchange information on their respective experiences in order
to promote the development of domestic markets;
*to unite their efforts to establish standards and an effective surveil-
lance of international securities transactions; and
*to provide mutual assistance to ensure the integrity of the markets
by a rigorous application of the standards and by effective enforcement
against offenses.
The change of emphasis and priorities (or perhaps simply a par-
ticularization of the defined mission) were seen in the opening re-
marks of Jean Saint-Geours, chairman of the Comission des
Operations de Bourse of France, at the Twentieth Annual Conference
of IOSCO in 1987. He said:
First public securities regulators should develop cooperation outside of
their own field, in particular with banking regulators. Second, interna-
tional accounting harmonization, which is crucial to compare the valua-
1 In 1992, perhaps because of the gap that developed between the SEC and the European
members of IOSCO over such issues as capital adequacy (discussed below), the SEC organized
the Council of Securities Regulators of the Americas (COSRA) of which the members are, for
the most part, the countries which were members of the InterAmerican Association of Securities
Commissions. While some of the work of COSRA parallels that being done by IOSCO,
COSRA is principally involved in developing detailed standards to guide the development of
securities law in the Americas in such areas as self-regulation, enforcement cooperation and
market oversight, all to the same end as IOSCO - the facilitation of cross-border trading. See
Securities Regulators of Americas, Caribbean Create Corporate Council, 24 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
837 (June 12, 1992); New Securities Regulators Should Define Principles, Schapiro Says, 25 SEc.
REG. & L. REP. 822 (June 11, 1993).
2 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES CoMMIssIoNs (losco), 1995 ANNUAL
REPORT 28 (1996) [hereinafter 1995 REPORT].
IOSCO: Its Mission and Achievement
17:15 (1996)
tion of public companies between different markets. Last, the
development of the cooperation in enforcement matters.
3
Each of these priorities has its origin in the most compelling, diffi-
cult and sometimes disputatious problems IOSCO has confronted
over the years: it has clashed with the Basle Committee on Banking
Regulation and Supervisory Practices of the Bank for International
Settlements (the Basle Committee); members have clashed among
themselves, notably over capital adequacy for securities firms; and it
has clashed with the International Accounting Standards Committee
over the role of IOSCO in developing international accounting stan-
dards. In each instance, as the discussion below will indicate, IOSCO
appears to be heading toward a happy solution.
MEMBERSHIP AND FINANCES
IOSCO has three classes of membership: regular, affiliate and as-
sociate.' Regular members are either governmental regulators of se-
curities markets, or a self-regulatory agency, such as a stock exchange,
when there is no government regulator. Thus, for instance, the
Bahrain Stock Exchange is a regular member since there is no govern-
mental regulator of securities markets in Bahrain. Of course, in many
instances such quasi-governmental entities are overseen with varying
degrees of care by a governmental authority, such as a minister of
finance. Associate members are associations of public regulatory bod-
ies having jurisdiction in the subdivisions of a country when the na-
tional regulator is a member;6 thus the North American Securities
Administrators Association is a member. And finally, affiliate mem-
bers are international organizations with a universal or a regional
scope, whose mission includes the regulation or the development of
capital markets, or any other organization recommended by the Exec-
utive Committee.7 Exchanges in countries where there is a govern-
mental regulatory authority and associations of dealers (e.g., the
National Association of Securities Dealers)' are the principal entities
3 See id. at 4.
4 Id. at 31.
5 See iL at 41-45.
6 See id. at 46.
7 See id. at 46-48.
8 The roster of IOSCO reflects the membership of the organization before the recent reor-
ganization that has resulted in three entities: NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc. which runs the NAS-
DAQ market; NASD Regulation, Inc. which performs the regulatory functions formerly carried
out by the National Association of Securities Dealers; and NASD, Inc. which is the parent of the
other two entities and which is the statutory self-regulator and is the legal continuation of the
National Association of Securities Dealers. See NASDR Announces Reorganization, Multimil-
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in this category, though it includes such other entities as the Commis-
sion of European Communities.
The dues have suprisingly remained remarkably constant - and
modest - since 1990: $5,000 per year for a member of any class.9 In
1988 most of the developed nation members contributed at that rate
even though the established level then was $3,000. These dues consti-
tuted about 83% of IOSCO's revenues in the year ended December
31, 1995, while net income from the annual conference in that year
contributed about 8%.10 Generally the net revenue from the annual
conferences is split between IOSCO and the sponsoring organizations.
Since 1989 (the first full year of operation as IOSCO) revenues have
grown from $115,000 to $991,000 in 1995, and membership from 45
regular, 3 associate and 2 affiliate members, to 73 regular, 10 associ-
ate and 37 affiliate members in 1995." Notable additions in 1995 were
the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the Russian Federa-
tion Commission on Securities and the Capital Market.
ORGANIZATION
IOSCO is governed by and its work done through a network of
committees. The topmost body, the Presidents Committee, is made
up of the presidents of all regular and associate members and meets
once a year at the annual conference. This Committee approves all
resolutions whereupon they become policies and pronouncements of
IOSCO. Its also elects members of the Executive Committee.
12
The principal governing body is the Executive Committee con-
sisting of twelve representatives elected by the Presidents Committee,
the chairs of the Emerging Markets and Technical Committees and a
representative from each of the regional standing committees.' This
committee meets throughout the year and appears to be primarily
concerned with the governance and management of IOSCO rather
than with the formulation of policy statements, although all Technical
Committee statements and actions must be approved by it.
The committee which might be said to do the "grunt work" with
respect to the most developed markets is the Technical Committee.
lion Dollar Budget Increase, 28 SEc. REG. & L. REP. 636 (May 17, 1996); SEC Approves NASD
Reorganization Rule Changes, 28 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 786 (June 21, 1996). At the time of this
writing, the relationship of each to IOSCO has not been deternined.
9 1995 REPORT, supra note 2, at 32.
10 Id. at 35.
11 Id. at 41-48.
12 Id. at 28.
13 See id. at 49.
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The Technical Committee tackles the problems confronting developed
markets.' 4 It is made up of the representatives of sixteen securities
agencies that regulate the larger and more developed markets in the
world. 15 Basically the Technical Committee is self-constituting, in the
sense that the Committee determines the countries which will be
members of it; similarly it determines its procedures and agenda.
The Technical Committee does its work through five Working
Groups.' 6 Each of these is responsible for reviewing major regulatory
issues related to international securities regulation in a defined area
and for making recommendations to the Technical Committee,
17
which in turn recommends them to the Presidents Committee and Ex-
ecutive Committee for approval and promulgation. The defined areas
for which the Working Groups are responsible are: multinational dis-
closure and accounting, regulation of secondary markets, regulation of
market intermediaries, enforcement and the exchange of information
and investment management.18
The Technical Committee was significantly strengthened in 1990
as the result of a Strategic Assessment developed by SEC Chairman
Richard Breeden and the staff of the SEC.19 On the first review of it
prior to the 1990 meeting in Santiago, Chile, there was considerable
controversy over parts of it, but these were resolved at the annual
conference (what happened behind closed doors isn't publicly known
since all committee meetings of IOSCO are closed). Breeden, who
was serving as chairman of the Executive Committee, was elected to a
two year term as chairman of the Technical Committee.
For the first time the Technical Committee had a chairman and a
focused plan of work. The reorganization, among other things, called
for fuller staffing of projects by members, limiting the number of
members (in January 1990 forty-two individuals representing seven-
14 Id. at i1.
15 See id at 50. Notably, the most recent addition to the Technical Committee has been
Mexico.
16 The advent of working groups, which have been extremely important in pressing forward
the work of IOSCO, followed the speech of then SEC Chairman John S. R. Shad suggesting their
organization at the 1986 annual meeting of IOSCO in Paris. Letter from David S. Ruder, former
SEC Chairman, presently William W. Gurley Memorial Professor of Law at Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law, to A.A. Sommer, Jr., former SEC Commissioner, presently Counsel, Mor-
gan, Lewis & Bockius (Sept. 4, 1996).
17 1995 REPORT, supra note 2, at 11.
18 Id. at 13-20.
19 Richard Breeden and the SEC, Strategic Assessment of the IOSCO Technical Committee
(Fall 1990) (private, unpublished document on file with IOSCO and the SEC).
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teen members attended the Technical Committee meeting) and more
meetings.2 °
The Emerging Markets Committee (formerly the Development
Committee) is concerned with the problems of emerging markets.2 '
IOSCO describes its mission in this manner:
The Emerging Markets Committee endeavors to promote the develop-
ing and improvement of efficiency of emerging securities markets by es-
tablishing principles and minimum standards, preparing training
programs for the personnel of members and facilitating exchange of in-
formation and transfer of technology and expertise.2 2
In 1995, training was provided to the staffs of six emerging nations and
some emerging nations were training the staffs of other emerging
nations.23
The Emerging Markets Committee performs a role with respect
to emerging markets that parallels the role the Technical Committee
has in relation to developed markets, and as such is an important part
of the work of IOSCO. Like the Technical Committee, it does its
work through working groups assigned to areas paralleling those es-
tablished by the Technical Committee. The defined areas for which
the Emerging Markets Committee Working Groups are responsible
include: disclosure and accounting, regulation of secondary markets,
regulation of intermediaries, enforcement and the exchange of infor-
mation and investment management.
2 4
This Committee has chalked up significant achievements. Per-
haps the most notable has been the development of a "blueprint" set-
ting forth, in the words of the 1993 IOSCO Annual Report, "all the
relevant issues to be dealt with when designing an adequate clearing
and settlement system that meets the G-30 standards as well as alter-
native solutions.... ."I This has led to an initiative in the Caribbean
region to assess the problems associated with implementing the
blueprint.
There are now four Regional Committees which meet to discuss
problems in their geographical areas. These are the Africa-Middle
20 Id.
21 1995 REPORT, supra note 2, at 21.
22 Id. at 30.
23 Id. at 3; The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has for several years run a three
week training program for regulators from emerging markets. At the last one there were more
than one hundred attendees from over seventy countries.
24 1995 REPORT, supra note 2, at 21-26.
25 Clearing and Settlement in Emerging Markets - A Blueprint: Report of the Emerging
Markets Committee of IOSCO (Oct. 1992) (unpublished document on file with IOSCO); <http://
www.IOSCO.org/>.
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East Regional Committee, the Asia-Pacific Regional Committee, the
European Regional Committee and the InterAmerican Regional
Committee.2 6 The geographic areas least represented in IOSCO are
Africa, the Middle East and former parts of the Soviet Union (other
than Russia).
Finally, there is a Consultative Committee constituted of affiliate
members which is intended to provide a channel for these members
to express their thoughts concerning matters under consideration by
IOSC. 7 Since the reports of this committee do not appear to be
published, it is difficult to judge its effectiveness, but there have been
some episodic conversations which suggest it has been low. Some evi-
dence of a sense that the Consultative Committee has not had the role
it should have may be seen in the report of the Technical Committee
in the 1995 Annual Report which says:
During the year, the Technical Committee Working Groups made a de-
liberate effort to increase the involvement of the Consultative Commit-
tee in their activities .... The cooperative relationship between the
Technical Committee and the Consultative Committee is evolving in a
positive direction.
28
Under the Technical Committee chairmanship of Jean Saint-
Geours, the Consultative Committee began to have greater opportu-
nities for input to the Technical Committee and the expectation and
hope is that it will increasingly become a more important presence in
the work of IOSCO. Clearly it has the potential of contributing
unique insights to the work of the organization.
ANNUAL CONFERENCE
IOSCO holds an annual conference which consists of closed
meetings of its committees and public meetings at which papers are
delivered on a variety of subjects.29 The papers and reports presented
at the meetings are available through the IOSCO office in Montreal.30
The meeting is generally managed by the regulator-member in the
host country, including the selection of the topics for the public meet-
ings and the speakers. Usually large numbers of persons in the securi-
ties industry, lawyers and others interested in international financial
26 1995 REPORT, supra note 2, at 28.
27 Id. at 30.
28 Id. at 20.
29 Id. at 31.
30 The documents made public during the annual conference can be obtained from the Gen-
eral Secretariat and are listed on the IOSCO Internet Home page: <http://www.IOSCO.org/>.
1995 REPoRT, supra note 2, at 5, 31-32.
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matters attend as "observers."'" While observers may not attend the
organization's committee meetings, they can and do attend open
meetings and participate in the social program.
The papers at the workshops or meetings generally reflect the
topics then commanding the attention of the international financial
world. Those at the Twentieth Annual Conference in 1995 dealt with
regulators and the media, emerging markets, objective evaluation of
companies, the impact of institutional management on company re-
sources and corporate governance, globalization of risks - coopera-
tion between banking and market regulators, the creation of new
technologies and the evolution of markets, international cooperation -
the exchange of information between regulators and its development
and the establishment of regional financial areas and perspectives on
regulatory harmonization.32 The variety and currency of the topics is
noteworthy; they touch all the "hot buttons."
ACHEVEMENTS AND CONTROVERSIES
Through the years IOSCO has issued innumerable reports and
studies, and its members have spent uncountable man-years in meet-
ings and preparing papers; their burden has been heavy since IOSCO
has, as a matter of policy, maintained a small secretariat. It has un-
questionably become a steadily bigger player in .the development of
international financial markets, achieving an importance equal to that
of the Basle Committee and International Association of Insurance
Supervisors, which plays an IOSCO-like role with respect to the insur-
ance industry.33 During its relatively brief life, international trading
has expanded enormously, new financial instruments and markets
have been born and flourished, new systemic threats have emerged
and a number of catastrophes have afflicted the financial world.34 It is
impossible to delineate all the actions IOSCO has taken to confront
the world's financial problems, but some might be noted, particularly
those which have embroiled it in controversy.
31 Id. at 4.
32 Id. at 5.
33 The importance of IOSCO's role in the development of international financial markets
today is evidenced by the attention world regulators give to IOSCO's position on issues. See,
e.g., Financial Conglomerates Face Tighter EC Regulatory Oversight, EuroWatch, May 29, 1992,
at vol. 4, no. 5 (stating that "the heightened level of interest shown by international groups of
regulators, such as the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Organi-
zation of Securities Commissions, seems likely to affect the choices the [European Community]
makes in addressing the supervision of conglomerates").
34 1995 REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
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A notable early achievement was the study of international eq-
uity offers and the publication of International Equity Offers.3 5 Rec-
ognizing that IOSCO has no power to impose any prescriptions, the
study made six recommendations. These recommendations looked to
the development of a single disclosure format which could be used in
offerings in several countries, the development of an annual report
format which would lend itself to satisfying disclosure requirements
for offerings, developing means of coordination among regulators to
expedite offerings and listings, seeking closer alignment of practices
(such as stabilization) in primary markets, the codification of princi-
ples to limit the extra-territorial application of domestic provisions
governing offerings and the development of greater standardization
with respect to restrictions on resale of non-publicly sold securities.
36
All of these recommendations, of course, had the single goal of facili-
tating cross-border access to capital by issuers.
The final recommendation was that each jurisdiction represented
on the Technical Committee report annually on the changes it had
made that could affect multinational offerings. 37 These annual reports
contain much information about the progress that is being made to
facilitate multinational offerings and reflect progress in facilitating
such offerings.
Perhaps the most significant impediment to multinational offer-
ings is in accounting practices. After a scuffle in 1994, the waters are
now calm and significant progress in removing this barrier may be on
the horizon.
From its earliest days, IOSCO has been a supporter of the Inter-
national Accounting Standards Committee (IASC).3 8 At the 1988 an-
nual meeting, the Presidents Committee urged the LASC and the
35 International Equity Offers: Report of the Technical Committee of IOSCO (Sept. 1989)
(unpublished document on file with IOSCO); <http:/Iwww.IOSCO.org>.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 The IASC was organized in 1973 by the accounting professions of nine developed coun-
tries for the purpose of developing accounting standards which would, it was hoped, become
accepted throughout the world. See The Standard Setters: As the Influence of the International
Accounting Standards Committee Grows, Christopher Nobes Explains How it Works, FiN. TnPAs,
Oct. 10, 1996, at 12. Steady progress has been made in reaching the goal: IASC standards have
been increasingly accepted in many developed countries, and most nations with developing mar-
ket economies look to them as the primary authority in developing their own standards. World-
wide Financial Dictionary, RR NEwswnE, June 18, 1986, available in LEXIS, News Library,
ARCNWS file. For an example of a developed country using IASC Standards, see Allister Wil-
son, International Accounting: Fifteen-part Harmony, The Banker, Sept. 1995, at *3, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS file. As of January 1996, the membership of the IASC con-
sisted of 116 accounting bodies in 86 countries. See Accountancy: Turning the Multinationals
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International Auditing Practices Committee to get on with their work
looking toward internationally acceptable accounting principles and
auditing standards.39 That theme continues through subsequent re-
ports until 1994 when there emerged publicly a rift between IOSCO
and IASC that had undoubtedly been smoldering in the privacy of
committee and other meetings.
IOSCO had indicated that while it supported the work of the
IASC, it had identified a set of "core" principles and would withhold
action on individual standards until all of the core principles were
promulgated."n A working party of the Technical Committee has con-
sidered, commented up and generally found to be satisfactory, but not
formally approved, some fourteen principles proposed by the IASC.
In a strongly worded address to the 1994 IOSCO meeting, Eiichi
Shiratori, then chairman of the IASC, took strong issue with these and
other positions of IOSCO. He reproached IOSCO for demanding a
process different from that which most of the members followed in
their own countries:
In other words, IOSCO expects IASC to have dealt with issues that
have not been, and perhaps cannot be, resolved by national standard
setting bodies. So, for example, IOSCO expects IASC to have com-
pleted an International Accounting Standard on Financial Instruments
before it will endorse the use of International Accounting Standards -
but the SEC (an IOSCO member)4' continues to endorse FASB pro-
nouncements even though the FASB is a long way from completing its
Financial Instruments project.
IOSCO's approach also raises one other question. Should IOSCO
endorse the process of setting International Accounting Standards in the
same way that IOSCO members endorse the process of setting national
standards? Or should IOSCO review, in detail, each International Ac-
counting Standard? IOSCO is following the second approach, some-
thing which most of its members do not do in their own jurisdictions.42
Nine months later, largely through the leadership of the SEC, the
breach was healed and in July, 1995, at the IOSCO annual meeting in
Paris, IOSCO and IASC proudly published a communiqu6 that they
Inside Out: Paul Pactor on the International Accounting Standards Committee's Efforts to Require
Better Information about 'Segments' in Companies, FN. Tuims, May 30, 1996, at 28.
39 IOSCO, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1989).
40 See IOSCO, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1995) [hereinafter 1994 REPORT].
41 Shiratori apparently suspected the SEC was behind the IOSCO intransigence which he
perceived.
42 Eiichi Shiratori, Efficiency in Multinational Securities Offerings: How to Promote Interna-
tional Harmonization of Accounting Standards (Oct. 1994) (unpublished speech on file with
IOSCO); <http'//www.IOSCO.org/>.
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had reached agreement 43 that by 1999" the IASC would develop a
comprehensive set of core principles which would allow the IOSCO
Technical Committee to endorse them for cross-border capital raising
and listing purposes in all global markets.45 Since the United States
has always been seen as a principal, if not the principal, obstacle to the
acceptance of financial statements for filing in the United States not
prepared in accordance with U.S. standards or reconciled to them, the
public acknowledgment by SEC officials that they were supportive of
the agreement lent it considerable additional importance.46
The agreement, of course, adopts the IOSCO position on post-
poning approvals of standards until the core standards as a body are
finished, but by adopting a deadline for completion of work on them,
it increases considerably the likelihood that an accommodation be-
tween IOSCO and the IASC will be accomplished on the short, rather
than the long, term.
Lest it be thought that the 1995 concordat was the first hint of
sunlight, it should be noted that previously IOSCO had approved In-
ternational Accounting Standard No. 7 with respect to the reporting
of cash flows and a number of jurisdictions, including notably the
United States, accepted filings using this standard.
With regard to auditing standards, there was a breakdown of dis-
cussions between IOSCO and the International Auditing Practices
Committee (IAPC) looking toward IOSCO approved auditing stan-
dards. This stemmed largely from the belief held by IOSCO that the
IAPC, in codifying principles which had been approved by IOSCO,
changed them in an unacceptable manner. However, discussions have
resumed and reportedly progress is being made.
Another notable battle concerned standards for capital adequacy
for securities firms. This time the struggle was not with an external
foe, but was rather intramural and basically pitted the SEC under
Chairman Richard Breeden against other members of IOSCO, princi-
pally the European ones. The controversy also involved the Basle
43 1995 REPORT, supra note 2, at 13.
44 This target has since been expedited to March, 1998.
45 1995 REPoRT, supra note 2, at 13.
46 In April, 1996, the SEC published a release applauding the IASC for accelerating the date
for completion of the core standards. It cautioned, however, that those principles would be
acceptable to the SEC only if they constituted a comprehensive, generally accepted basis of
accounting, were of high quality that would result in compatibility and transparency, provided
for full disclosure, and were rigorously interpreted and applied. See Steve Burkholder, FASB
Advisory Council Gives Support to Derivatives Accounting Proposal, 28 SEc. REG. & L. REP. 537
(Apr. 19, 1996).
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Committee which was seeking to develop capital standards for both
banks and securities firms.47
The heart of the intramural IOSCO quarrel was simply how the
"haircut" should be applied to the equity securities in a security firm's
portfolio for purposes of calculating its net capital.' The European
regulators and their allies pushed for a so-called "building block" ap-
proach which would charge against the equity portfolio 8% across the
board, and then would charge another 4% to 8% depending on the
specific risk, which would depend on the diversification of the portfo-
lio and the extent to which it contained liquid and marketable
stocks.4 9 Breeden thought this approach, if adopted in the United
States (which of course it would not have to be even if IOSCO ap-
proved it), would result in a significant weakening of protection
against insolvency of securities firms.50 The situation was further ag-
gravated when Sir Leon Brittan, vice-chairman of the Commission of
the European Communities, the principal speaker at the main ban-
quet of the conference in London in 1992, spoke out vigorously
against the Breeden position.51
While this controversy continues unresolved, its importance has
been eclipsed by the considerable progress which IOSCO has made in
reaching agreements with the Basle Committee on other issues, in-
cluding disclosures for supervisory purposes concerning derivatives,
public disclosure of trading activities of banks and securities firms and
developing value-at-risk models for regulatory purposes,52 although
with respect to the last as proposed by the Basle Committee, IOSCO
has expressed some reservations53 which appear likely to be resolved.
The importance of heightened international cooperation among
regulators was highlighted in the final communiqu6 of the heads of
47 1995 REPORT, supra note 2, at 16.
48 Tracy Corrigan & Robert Peston, IOSCO Setback Over Common Capital Requirements -
IOSCO Conference, 1 FiN. Trams, Oct. 27, 1992, at 33.
49 There have been various articulations of the building block method; this is a simplified
version of it.
50 Robert Peston & Tracy Corrigan, Hopes Dwindle for New Agreement on Capital Require-
ments - IOSCO Conference, 1 FiN. TimpS, Oct. 28, 1992, at 30. The determination of the appro-
priate haircut SEC rules is difficult; in general, a 15%-30% haircut on liquid equity positions is
the benchmark, with a number of variations of that depending on the circumstances.
51 Robert Peston & Tracy Corrigan, Sir Leon Brittan Joins Row Over Capital Standards -
IOSCO Conference, 1 FiN. TimEs, Oct. 29, 1992, at 28; See also Tracy Corrigan, SEC and Regula-
tors Deadlocked Over Capital Requirements, 1 FiN. Tuvms, Oct. 30, 1992, at 31.
52 1995 REPORT, supra note 2, at 15-16.
53 Id. at 16.
IOSCO: Its Mission and Achievement
17:15 (1996)
state of the G-7 nations at the conclusion of their meeting in Halifax,
Nova Scotia, in June, 1995:
The growth of financial markets, the development of new instruments,
and a desire for diversification of investment have spurred global inte-
gration of national markets and increased liquidity. These developments
have led to a more efficient allocation of capital and thus greater growth
of economic activity. At the same time, with today's highly integrated
financial markets, there is a greater potential for the rapid transmission
of financial disturbances. Closer international cooperation in the regula-
tion and supervision of financial institutions and markets is essential to
the continued safeguarding of the financial system and to prevent ero-
sion of necessary prudential standards.54
In response to this communique, in May, 1996, IOSCO and the
Basle Committee released a joint statement identifying the major
principles which should guide their approach to the supervision of in-
ternationally active financial institutions.55 These principles include
greater access to information possessed by regulators, better commu-
nications among them and the strengthening of cooperative arrange-
ments to enhance the ability of each regulatory authority to supervise
firms operating from its jurisdiction that are engaged in significant
cross-border trading activities.
5 6
To hasten the process of international cooperation, especially in
enforcement matters, in 1994, IOSCO, describing some jurisdictions
as "under-regulated and uncooperative," adopted resolutions recom-
mitting members to adherence to the cooperation commitments en-
tailed in membership and called upon each of them to do a written
self-evaluation assessing the member's ability to provide mutual
assistance and cooperation to foreign securities and futures regula-
tors. 7 The resolution also provided that new members would have to
similarly commit themselves and confirm that they would be able and
willing to adhere to the principles and provide self-evaluation. 8 The
54 See Communiqud from the G-7 Halifax Summit, released June 16, 1995, DAILY EXEC.
REP. (BNA) 122.
55 Response of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and of the International Or-
ganization of Securities Commissions to the Request of the G-7 Heads of Government at the
June 1995 Halifax Summit (May 1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with IOSCO); <http://
www.IOSCO.org/>.
56 Id. at 6.
57 1994 REPORT, supra note 40, at 4, 8; Resolution on Commitment to Basic IOSCO Princi-
ples of High Regulatory Standards and Mutual Cooperation and Assistance (Oct. 1994) (private,
unpublished document on file with IOSCO).
58 rd.
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resolutions further provided that the self-evaluations had to be filed
with the General Secretariat and would be available to members. 9
One of the principal objectives of IOSCO has been to stimulate
"memoranda of understanding" (MOU) among national regulators
committing the parties, to the extent permitted by law, to cooperate in
enforcing their respective securities laws.6° In 1988 only a handful of
such memoranda existed. In 1991 the Technical Committee adopted
ten principles to serve as a blueprint for the negotiation and imple-
mentation of MOUs. 6 1 This initiative has unquestionably facilitated
the development of the more than 200 MOUs that have now been
signed, to some twenty-five of which the United States is a party.6 2
CONCLUSION
Unquestionably, IOSCO has grown stronger and more influential
and has proven its value, relevance and even indispensability. It has
achieved a status with respect to securities regulation comparable to
that enjoyed by the Basle Committee on Banking Regulation and Su-
pervisory Practices with respect to banking regulation. Its maturing
was hastened by Richard Breeden's reorganization of the Technical
Committee in 1991 and the leadership he provided to that Committee;
the Committee has continued to be the heart of IOSCO's activities.
This renewed vigor was evident in the 1991 Annual Report: it re-
flected a new vigor, a new resolution; it bespoke an organization con-
fident of its footing and its mission.63 It is poised for even more
growth in stature and effectiveness.
In this time of lightning swift developments in international capi-
tal markets, it is essential that there be a meeting place for securities
regulators to pool their power, their intellectual resources, their ex-
59 Id.
60 1995 REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.
61 Principles for Memoranda of Understanding: Report of the Technical Committee of
IOSCO (Sept. 1991) (unpublished document on file with IOSCO); <http://www.IOSCO.org/>.
62 1995 REPORT, supra note 2, at 3; The important role of IOSCO as a mechanism for coop-
erative international securities regulation was significantly strengthened at the 1988 annual
meeting in Melbourne when then SEC Chairman David D. Ruder delivered an SEC Policy
Statement on Regulation of International Securities Markets which had the unanimous approval
of the Commission. This document set forth the elements necessary to achieve an effective regu-
latory structure for an international securities market system, which would include efficient mar-
ket structures and practices, sound disclosure systems and fair and honest markets. This
document appears to have been influential in the development by IOSCO of its priorities and
projects. Policy Statement on the Regulation of the International Securities Markets, Securities
Act Release No. 6807, 53 Fed. Reg. 46,963 (Nov. 21, 1988).
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periences and their information to cope with proliferating problems.
The abilities of the members will, in the years to come, be taxed to
their fullest in assuring the efficiency and honesty of markets that
change daily. But the organization has built a foundation upon which
to build the responses needed to the mounting challenges.
At the 1994 annual meeting in Tokyo, Messr. Jean Saint-Geours,
then chairman of the Technical Committee and President of the
Comission des Operations de Bourse in Paris, fittingly characterized
IOSCO:
Our organization is some kind of laboratory, a crucible where to-
morrow's markets are planned. In the last ten years, since IOSCO
opened itself up to the whole world, a genuine community of market
regulators has concretized. Mutual understanding has noticeably
progressed in such a multilateral framework. This mutual understanding
is the common soil from which tomorrow's technical solutions will
sprout. Our recommendations, even though they do not belong to the
classical legal order, are nevertheless of an obvious normative scope.
My experience as a regulator taught me that hindrances to international
cooperation seldom are of a technical nature; they have more to do with
cultural differences, in the wider meaning of the term. Thus, any im-
provement in mutual understanding among regulators contributes to the
lifting of technical obstacle [sic].'
64 Jean Saint-Geours, Opening Speech (Oct. 1994) (unpublished document on file with
IOSCO); <http'/www.IOSCO.org/>.
